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CONGLOMERATE MERGERS: THE
DEVELOPING ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES
JOHN VANDERSTAR*
One need not point out that conglomerate mergers, as well as other
varieties, have been occurring at a record pace in recent years. Nor is it any
secret that many congressmen and the antitrust enforcement authorities have
grown increasingly concerned about these activities, fearing not only adverse
economic effects, but adverse social and political effects as well.
Conglomerate mergers seem to attract special attention for two reasons.
First, this is virtually the only kind of significant merger activity the very
largest firms can engage in, and the conduct of these firms is always top news.
Second, the conglomerate merger does not "fit" as neatly into antitrust doc-
trine as other mergers do, and hence, there is a good deal of mystery about
what the operating rules are or should be. Exploring the development of
those rules or guidelines will be the focus of this paper.
There are generally considered to be three kinds of mergers: horizontal,
vertical and conglomerate. A horizontal merger is one between firms that
compete directly. A vertical merger is one between a firm and one of its sup-
pliers (a "backward" integration) or one of its customers (a "forward" inte-
gration). This leaves conglomerate mergers, which are simply mergers that
are neither horizontal nor vertical.'
Why do conglomerate mergers occur? There are many reasons, and no
one would be so bold as to attempt a complete listing. One reason is a de-
sire to diversify, which in itself can have several motivations. A firm that
has grown large and profitable in a particular product line may wish to
continue its growth but, because of the antitrust laws or other considera-
tions, may be unable to grow horizontally or vertically. Or a firm tied to a
single product or class of customer (the Government, for example) may be
concerned about its vulnerability if, for reasons unrelated to the firm's com-
petence, the single product should suddenly be made obsolete or the single
customer class should cut back its purchases. 2 Viewed from the acquired
company's standpoint, a conglomerate merger is often an effective method
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.S.E., Princeton University, 1954; LL.B.,
Harvard University, 1961.
1 One could quibble about classifying "market extension" mergers (between firms
that sell the same product but do so in separate, distinct geographic markets and hence
do not directly compete) as horizontal or conglomerate, but it seems to make more
sense to classify them as conglomerates.
2 A desire to reduce reliance on government purchases was an important factor in the
decision of several companies to become conglomerates. An example is Ling-Temco-Vought,
Inc., once heavily concentrated in defense production. Its chairman, James J. Ling, has
said that he was urged by the Pentagon and other government sources to diversify if he
wanted LTV to survive. See J. COMMERCE, Oct. 24, 1969, at I, col. 4.
596
THE DEVELOPING ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
for the owners of a closely held company to convert their personal estates
into more marketable securities. Conglomerate mergers between firms in
related product lines also create opportunities for increased efficiencies
through the meshing of production or marketing facilities or methods,
and for the introduction of new and aggressive management into a stagnat-
ing industry. Access to available capital or tax loss advantages can also stim-
ulate mergers of all types, but principally those of the conglomerate variety.
It goes without saying, of course, that not all of these reasons are consistent
with furthering the health of the economy in all cases, and further, that
there are also distinctly anticompetitive reasons for some conglomerate
mergers.
A question often asked is whether conglomerate mergers should be
stopped. Of course, that is not a relevant inquiry at all, no more so than
asking whether mergers of all kinds should be stopped. Instead, there are
two questions that seem to be worth asking. The first is whether any con-
glomerate mergers can be stopped under present law and, if so, which ones.
The second is whether the law should be amended to prohibit some mergers
that are now beyond legal attack. The leadership of the Department of Jus-
tice's Antitrust Division has not been of a single mind on these questions,
which is not surprising in view of their complexity. 3
I. BASIC MERGER LAW
Let us turn first to the key statute, section 7 of the Clayton Act, 4 the
first paragraph of which states:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or in-
directly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.5
Whereas this provision is addressed to acquisitions by corporations engaged
in interstate or foreign commerce (the word "commerce" being so defined
3 Compare Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 1313 (1965) with McLaren, Statement Before House Committee on Ways and
Means, in 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,233 (March 12, 1969).
4 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
5Before the 1950 amendment (the Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125), this
part of section 7 dealt only with stock acquisitions and primarily with horizontal ac-
quisitions:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is acquired and
the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any
section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32, as amended, 15 U.S.C. J 18 (1964).
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in section 1 of the Clayton Act),6 the second paragraph broadens section 'Ts
coverage:
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the. Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of one or more corporations engaged in com-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or the use of such stock
by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.7
Note that both paragraphs apply only where both parties to the merger
are corporations and where the acquired corporation is engaged in inter-
state or foreign commerce. More important, both paragraphs prohibit only
those mergers which "may" have either of two anticompetitive effects: (1)
"substantially to lessen competition," or (2) "substantially . . . to tend to
create a monopoly." Of course, the word "may" could be construed, per-
haps more in accord with its natural meaning, as indicating a legislative
purpose to proscribe any merger having the possibility of producing either
of the stated anticompetitive effects. And since the Clayton Act, unlike the
Sherman Act," is not enforceable through the criminal process, there would
not be a compelling constitutional argument against use of the word "may"
in this sense. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court has squarely held that
the challenged merger must have a probability of producing one of the pro-
scribed results before it can be barred under section 7.10 There must be
"demonstrable and substantial anti-competitive effects."" But since the
Clayton Act (again unlike the Sherman Act) is designed to reach practices
in their incipiency, a certainty that monopoly or reduced competition will
occur is not required.12
Moreover, and this is of special importance in the case of conglomer-
ate mergers, the anticompetitive effect must be felt "in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country.""3 Thus, proof of a section 7 violation
6 15 U.s.c. § 12 (1964).
7 15 U.s.c. § 18 (1964). This section underwent a change in 1950 similar to the change
in the first paragraph.
8 For this reason, the "exemptions" in the third paragraph of section 7 - corporations'
purchases of stock solely for investment and the formation of subsidiaries -do not seem
terribly meaningful, as they apply only when there is no substantial lessening of com-
petition.
The fourth paragraph of section 7 relates to the acquisition and construction of feeder
lines and other extensions by common carriers. The fifth paragraph exempts mergers that
occurred before October 15, 1914, when the original section 7 was enacted. The sixth
paragraph exempts mergcrs duly cleared by certain federal administrative agencies or the
Secretary of Agriculture.
.9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1964).
1) Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
11 United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
12 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
13 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). -
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seemingly must include definition of a product market ("line of com-
merce")14 and a geographic market ("section of the country").' 5
II. ANTITRUST ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
There have been about 15 major conglomerate merger cases filed in the
federal courts and at the Federal Trade Commission in the past few years.16
Through these cases and such other sources as the Department's so-
called Merger Guidelines,'7 released May 30, 1968, it is now possible to state
the principal arguments that can be made against conglomerate mergers,
insofar as the antitrust laws are concerned, and to make some evaluation
of the kind of proof that might be germane to the issues thus raised.
The three principal arguments that have met with some success thus
far are, in a somewhat descending order of clarity, those that involve mergers
(1) which create a substantial danger of reciprocal dealing, (2) which create
a substantial risk that the market position of an already dominant firm (one
of the parties to the merger) in a concentrated market will be enhanced or
entrenched, or (3) in which one party, but for the merger, would have been
a potential entrant into the other party's market. The Government has also
asserted in several cases that the merger under attack would contribute sig-
nificantly to increasing concentration in industry generally.
A. Reciprocal Dealing
There are three basic kinds of reciprocal dealing that can and do occur.
For convenience, they may be labeled coercive, apprehensive and mutual.
The first involves the actual or threatened use of economic power by a
very large company. Where the company is an important buyer of the prod-
ucts of a small company and also, perhaps through a separate division or a
subsidiary, sells products which the small company buys, the large company
14 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
16 The Supreme Court has decided two: FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568
(1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). The Third Circuit
has decided three: Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d
506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1970); General Foods Corp. v. FTC,
386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); United States v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963). The Seventh Circuit has decided one: Ekco Prods.
Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965). Six others have been decided by district courts,
mainly on whether a preliminary injunction should issue: Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp., 5
TRADE REG. REP. 73,035 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 29, 1969); United States v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc.,
301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. 111. 1969); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co.,
288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F.
Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J.
1965). One has been decided by a Federal Trade Commission hearing examiner, The Ben-
dix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,896 (FTC Sept. 12, 1969). Two court cases are not yet
the subject of reported decisions: United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civil
No. 69-C-924 (N.D. Ill., filed April 28, 1969); United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.,
Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., filed April 16, 1969).
17 DEP'T JUsTIcE MERGER GUMELINES, in 1 TRADz REG. REP. 4430 (May 30, 1968).
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may demand that the small company buy from the large company or risk
losing it as a customer.
The second kind involves a similar situation but lacks the actual or
threatened use of power by the large company. Instead, the small company
apprehends or imagines that its position as a supplier of the large company
will be more secure if it is also a customer of the large company.
A different situation creates the third kind of reciprocity. It occurs
where neither company is significantly larger nor more powerful than the
other or where neither is highly dependent upon the other's customer. How-
ever, the companies have grown accustomed to the mutual buyer-seller re-
lationship and neither will work too hard to find an alternative source for
the product it buys from the other.
All three situations contain an anticompetitive element, viz., the intro-
duction of an extraneous factor into the competitive picture. In the first two
instances, competitors of the large company cannot effectively compete for
the small company's business, not because the large company's product or
service is superior or lower priced but because it has a form of economic
leverage. In the third case, the same element is present, though perhaps to
a considerably lesser degree. The analogy to tying agreements is obvious. 8
Over half of the conglomerate cases noted in this section'9 involved
reciprocity issues. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.20 is an example. Consoli-
dated, a giant food wholesaler, was an important outlet for a large number of
food processors. It acquired Gentry, Inc., a manufacturer of dehydrated onion
and garlic, products which many of the food processors used. The FTC
moved against the acquisition, demonstrating that Consolidated used its
purchasing power to induce its suppliers to buy from Gentry. The Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed a divestiture order,2' stating that reciprocity is
'one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust
laws are aimed. '22 United States v. General Dynamics Corp.23 involved sim-
ilar evidence of practices that occurred after General, an industrial giant
which sold most of its products to the Government, acquired Liquid Car-
bonic, Inc., a producer of carbon dioxide and other products which were
used by many of the companies that sold their products to General. The
district court held the acquisition illegal.
18 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
19 Cases cited note 16 supra.
20 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
21 62 F.T.C. 929 (1963), rev'd, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964).
22 380 U.S. at 594.
23 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The General Dynamics case is notable for another reason. The Department of Justice
sought a declaration by the court that reciprocal dealing is a Sherman Act violation,
irrespective of the merger aspect of the case. The court drew the direct analogy to tying
cases and, applying the standards of those cases, ruled against the Government. There
was insufficient proof, the court held, that competition had actually been injured in the
carbon dioxide market. Moreover, the volume of annual business actually involved in
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An important question not involved in either Consolidated or General
Dynamics is whether a mere structural relationship of the merging partners
which creates an opportunity for reciprocal dealing is sufficient, without any
evidence of actual coercion, to stop the merger. 24 Two of the Third Circuit
cases have answered this question in the affirmative. In United States v. In-
gersoll-Rand Co., 25 the principal defendant, a large manufacturer of indus-
trial machinery, proposed to acquire three leading manufacturers of under-
ground coal mining machinery. The Department of Justice sued and moved
for a preliminary injunction, showing that Ingersoll-Rand was a large pur-
chaser of steel, that the steel companies were large users of coal, and that
coal producers, to retain the goodwill of the steel companies, might be in-
duced to purchase their mining machinery from the companies Ingersoll-
Rand was acquiring. The district court in Pittsburgh accepted this some-
what tenuous argument and enjoined the acquisitions.26 The Third Circuit
affirmed, quoting the district court's observation that
the mere existence of this purchasing power [of steel] might make its con-
scious employment toward this end unnecessary; the possession of the
power is frequently sufficient, as sophisticated businessmen are quick to
see the advantages in securing the goodwill of the possessor.2
7
To the same effect is Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Consol-
idated Industries, Inc.28 reversing the Delaware district court's denial of a
preliminary injunction against the threatened takeover of Allis-Chalmers by
White. 29
This, of course, involves the second kind of reciprocity listed above -
or perhaps even the third. (The Department of Justice prefers to call this
"reciprocity effect.") How can this argument be met? Four district court
cases provide the answer. United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd.30 was a suit
reciprocal dealing arrangements was only about one-third of the $500,000 worth of business
foreclosed by the tying agreements in International Salt, which in turn was the smallest
dollar volume that had resulted in a declaration that specific tying agreements were
illegal even without specific proof that competition had been injured. But see United
States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
The Department has attacked reciprocal dealing directly in other non-merger cases.
See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., Civil No. 69-728 (W.D. Pa., filed June
13, 1969); United States v. General Tire & Rubber Co., Civil No. C-67-155 (N.D. Ohio, filed
March 2, 1967). U.S. Steel has consented to a sweeping judgment. Similarly, the FTC has
obtained affidavits of voluntary discontinuance from several large companies.
24 The Department of Justice has stated that it will generally attack a merger on the
ground of reciprocal dealing possibilities if the resulting company sells in a market whose
members make 15 percent or more of their total purchases from the resulting company
and its competitors, unless "some special market factor" clearly shows that the possibility
of reciprocal dealing is "remote .. " MERGER GuMELINES, supra note 17, no. 19(a), at 6690.
25 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
26218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
27 320 F.2d at 524 (3d Cir. 1963).
28 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1970).
29 Cf. Turner, supra note 3, at 1390.
80 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965).
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in the district court of New Jersey (which is also in the Third Circuit) to en-
join Penick's proposed acquisition by Reynolds Tobacco Company. Reynolds
was a major buyer of paper, while Penick, the fourth largest seller of
starch, sold starch to paper companies. Thus the case was stronger than
Ingersoll-Rand because any reciprocity coercion could be exercised di-
rectly on the paper industry, rather than through the two-industry
chain involved in Ingersoll-Rand. Moreover, there was evidence that rec-
iprocity had been and was a common practice in the starch industry. How-
ever, Reynolds submitted testimony stating that it had a company policy
against reciprocity and that Penick would be autonomously managed and
would not even have data on Reynolds' paper purchasing. This evidence
was not controverted by the Government, and the district court declined
to enjoin the acquisition before trial.3 '
Roughly the same thing happened in United States v. Northwest Indus-
tries, Inc.,3 2 and again relief was denied the Government, this time by the
district court in Chicago. Similar defense evidence in the two ITT cases in
Connecticut,33 involving the proposed acquisitions of Grinnell and Hart-
ford Fire, defeated the Government in those two cases as well (although the
district court there was also rather dubious about the government's ev-
idence that the acquisitions would create opportunities for reciprocal deal-
ing).
Examination of these cases will show what kind of evidence the defense
lawyer will have to marshall if the "mere existence" rationale of Ingersoll-
Rand and Allis-Chalmers is followed. Many companies have adopted a def-
inite policy against reciprocal dealing, and evidence of such a policy is im-
portant, buttressed, when possible, by testimonfy of key officials explaining
the reasons for the policy. Evidence of steps the company has taken to en-
force the policy, whether through education of its employees or announce-
ments to its suppliers and customers, would also be helpful. It may even be
that the corporate structure is antithetical to reciprocal dealing. For exam-
ple, both Northwest Industries and ITT treat major divisions and subsid-
iaries as separate profit centers, with the management of each center having
a financial stake in its profitability. Although reciprocal dealing might in-
crease sales of one profit center, it might also increase the cost (or decrease
31 The history of this case is interesting. At first things moved along snappily. The
complaint was filed on April 6, 1965, one day before the scheduled closing. The merging
parties agreed to postpone the closing until determination of the preliminary injunction
issue. Briefs and voluminous documentary evidence were submitted to the court before the
actual hearing, which began on May 11. Eight witnesses testified. On May 21, Judge
Coolahan issued his opinion and order denying the government's motion. There followed
over four years of discovery and other maneuvering, and on September 22, 1969, the
defendants entered into a consent order under which Reynolds divested itself of Penick
and agreed not to reacquire Penick or, for a period of five years, to acquire any other
starch producer or even enter that field through internal expansion.
32 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
33 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn, 1969),
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the quality) of goods purchased by another, and the management of the
latter profit center is not likely to be enamored of such a practice. Finally,
there is negative evidence that is important. A company that engages in re-
ciprocal dealing will generally have an official (called the Trade Relations
Director, Special Sales Director, or other title) responsible for the coordina-
tion and subsequent distribution of sales and purchasing data to the appro-
priate purchasing and sales personnel. The absence of any official with such
a role (and the absence of any alternative means of collecting and redistrib-
uting the data) will help negate a purpose to engage in reciprocity.
B. Acquisition of an Already Dominant Company
Just as the FTC was instrumental in developing the argument that re-
ciprocal dealing can taint a conglomerate merger, it was the Commission
that broke ground in another area.
In 1957 Clorox was the leading brand in the $80 million household
liquid bleach market. Its share of the market was 48.8 percent, and it was
the only bleach producer selling nationally. With two firms accounting for
almost 65 percent of sales, and six for almost 80 percent, the market was
highly concentrated. In that year Clorox was acquired by Procter & Gamble,
a large diversified company and a giant in the field of soaps, detergents and
cleansers (but not liquid bleach), with 54.4 percent of the $1 billion market.
That market was also highly concentrated, with 80 percent accounted for
by three companies. Procter saw in the Clorox acquisition a means of entry
into a field with which it was already quite familiar - high-turnover, low-
priced household products marketed chiefly through grocery stores but pre-
sold to consumers through mass advertising.
The FTC proceeded against the merger and concluded that the sub-
stitution of Procter for the already dominant Clorox might substantially
lessen competition by raising barriers to entry in the bleach market and by
dissuading the smaller firms from competing aggressively.3 4 (Another con-
clusion, which will be discussed in the next section, was that the acquisition
eliminated the potential competition of Procter.) The Sixth Circuit re-
versed, 35 but the Commission prevailed in the Supreme Court.36
What difference would it make, it may be asked, if a firm like Clorox,
already dominant in its field, were acquired by a still-larger firm which did
not sell the same product? The critical fact in the case seemed to be adver-
tising. All liquid bleach is apparently identical, which means that heavy
advertising and sales promotion are extremely important in marketing the
product. Clorox, with 1957 sales of just under $40 million, spent $3.7 mil-
lion - nearly 10 percent of sales - on advertising, and another $1.7 mil-
lion on other promotion. Similarly, Procter spent nearly 10 percent of its
34 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673 (FTC 1963).
35 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966).
36 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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annual sales (of $1.1 billion) on advertising in 1957 and nearly 5 percent
more on other promotion. In fact, Procter, the nation's largest advertiser,
was also a multiproduct advertiser, which gave it the ability to command
substantial volume discounts from the media and to achieve other econ-
omies. The Commission and the Court thought that these enormous adver-
tising economies, coupled with Procter's financial resources generally, could
make Clorox virtually impregnable: smaller bleach producers would not
compete too aggressively for fear of retaliation, and prospective new bleach
producers, faced with the prospects of huge short-term defensive advertising
campaigns by Procter-Clorox, might be far less willing to enter the market.
Also, retailers might give Clorox bleach preferred shelf space in recognition
of Procter's overall market importance.8 7
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. 3 8 presented a more mixed
picture. Wilson, the nation's leading manufacturer of a wide variety of
sporting goods (and also an LTV subsidiary), sought to acquire Nissen Cor-
poration, the leading manufacturer of gymnastic equipment (a field Wilson
was not engaged in prior to the acquisition). Thus, this was a "product exten-
sion" merger like that in Procter-Clorox. On the one hand, the advantages of
advertising and promotion in the gymnastic business were shown by the rec-
ord to be nil. (Apparently gym coaches and teachers are less subject to emo-
tional appeals than the rest of us are.) On the other hand, the court saw
three possible adverse results from the merger. One was that Nissen, whose
share of the market had been slipping, might benefit from its alliance with
Wilson, because the latter's importance to sporting equipment dealers could
make the dealers receptive to suggestions that Nissen products be promoted
with special vigor. Another was that Wilson would also benefit - and en-
trench its leading position -by being able to offer an even broader array
of sports equipment.39 The third factor was that Nissen's smaller compet-
itors, which had previously resisted offers to sell to other large sporting
equipment manufacturers, might alter their position with Wilson in the
picture, oligopoly being the possible result. These conclusions, when added
to others (to be discussed below), led the court to enter a preliminary in-
junction against the proposed merger.
Thus far, the Government has had less success with this line of argument
in the ITT cases in Connecticut. The argument was in three principal parts.
First, the Government claimed that the acquisition of Grinnell, the leading
manufacturer of automatic sprinkler systems, would enable ITT, a leading
factor in various heating and air conditioning fields, to gain a competitive
37 The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion on the appeal of General Foods,
another diversified giant, from the FTC decision barring its acquisition of S.O.S., one of
the two firms that dominated the soap pad industry. General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386
F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
38 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
39 The injunctions entered in the Allis-Chalmers and Ingersoll-Rand cases discussed
above were based in part upon this line of reasoning.
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advantage by engaging in package or system selling. But defense affidavits
(principally from Grinnell's competitors) took strong issue with the Govern-
ment. They showed that sprinkler installation is a specialty business done
by specialty contractors (the Government conceded this), that sprinkler con-
tracts are generally awarded on the basis of bids solicited for sprinkler in-
stallation alone, and that Grinnell, which already distributed some heating
and air conditioning products, was in a position to offer package deals but
had not found it advantageous to do so. Second, the Government contended
that the acquisition of both Grinnell and Hartford, an important fire in-
surance company, would give Grinnell an opportunity to increase its sprin-
kler sales to Hartford's fire insurance customers. But much of Hartford's fire
insurance, the evidence showed, was written by independent agents who
represented other companies as well, or was part of insurance pools on large
buildings; in neither case would there be any strong likelihood that sprin-
klers manufactured by an affiliate of one of the insurance companies would
be recommended. Moreover, the recommendations of fire insurance agents
would not carry much weight with architects and general contractors, who
do much of the selecting of sprinkler systems. The importance of competi-
tive bidding in that selection process would also militate against Grinnell
having any advantage because of the affiliation with Hartford. Third, the
Government contended that the pair of acquisitions would injure competi-
tion by giving ITT access to Hartford's surplus (which was in excess of the
surplus required by law to cover current insurance business), and by giving
Grinnell, through access to ITT's financial resources, an opportunity to in-
crease credit sales and leasing, as well as advertising and promotion. But
again the facts suggested that no injury to competition was threatened. For
one thing, ITT President Harold S. Geneen testified unequivocally that
ITT does not intend to remove Hartford's surplus and that the company
had made a commitment to that effect to Hartford. For another, defense ev-
idence showed that it was possible for Grinnell to finance increased credit,
leasing, advertising and promotion even without ITT's resources.
The Federal Trade Commission has also been unsuccessful in a recent
case involving this issue. 4° The merger involved was between the Bendix
and Fram corporations. Bendix is a diversified manufacturer of compo-
nents and assemblies for aerospace, automotive and other uses. Its sales are
in the $1 billion class. Fram, one-fifteenth the size of Bendix, was third in
the automotive filter line and also was a substantial producer of filter water
separators and aerospace fuel filters. There were no horizontal or vertical
aspects to the merger, and complaint counsel strove to bring the case within
the Procter precedent. The hearing examiner ruled last September that the
evidence did not measure up, however.41 Although a superficial relationship
40The Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REC. REP. 18,896 (FTC Sept. 12, 1969).
41 Id. Complaint counsel have appealed and the case is now pending before the full
Commission.
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between the companies' product markets existed, Bendix' automotive parts
line is generally sold to repair garages, while Fram's filters are a "TBA"
item generally sold through gasoline service stations. Thus, there was no
built-in opportunity for Bendix to employ any leverage to achieve preferred
dealer treatment for Fram filters. Nor was joint advertising likely, for Ben-
dix was a small advertiser and, in any event, did not direct much of its pro-
motional efforts at potential Fram customers. Finally, Fram did not enjoy
Clorox' dominance in its market, and in fact some of its principal competi-
tors were subsidiaries of large companies like General Motors, Textron and
Tenneco.
Thus, knowing when a proposed merger will founder on the arguments
discussed in this section is difficult. However, although market share per-
centages and other such numerical indices are not useful guides, some broad
guidelines may be of assistance to acquisition-minded businessmen. A
merger that would result in a very large increase in the absolute size (assets
or sales) of a firm which is already dominant in its field is likely to be chal-
lenged, and might even be presumptively illegal, When the acquired firm
is already dominant and gains any significant competitive advantage from
the proposed acquisition - such as the advertising economies involved in
Procter or a large supply of ready cash - the merger may be endangered.
Product extension mergers in which the acquiring firm is also dominant
and thus might have considerable leverage with dealers or other pur-
chasers may also be in trouble. A merger that might substantially increase
barriers to entry in the market of the acquired firm can also invite attack
where the latter market is already concentrated or is becoming so.
C. Elimination of Potential Entrant
If a firm enters a new field by internal expansion, the new field the.
oretically becomes more competitive because the number of sellers increases
by one. (Almost the same would be true if the firm entered by acquiring a
small company and expanding it.) If, instead, it enters by acquiring an ex-
isting large firm, there is no increase in the number of sellers. Nor is there
a decrease. However, if it would have entered by expansion but chooses to
enter by acquisition, the possible increase in the number of sellers is elim-
inated. Thus, entry of such a firm by acquisition results in a market with
fewer sellers than might have been there, and in a sense there has been a
theoretical lessening of competition. Moreover, the existence of a firm that
might enter if the market were ripe for entry (because of high profit mar-
gins, for example) would tend to keep the market competitive (by keeping
prices and hence profit margins down, for example); entry of that firm by
acquisition would eliminate that competitive force.42
just this reasoning was involved in Procter and Wilson, and it contrib-
uted to the conclusion that the mergers in those two cases should not be
permitted. The difficult question, however, is not the economic theory but
42S ee United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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the facts. When is a firm fairly characterized as a potential entrant? The
Supreme Court in Procter upheld the Commission's findings on this point:
(1) Procter had considered entering the liquid bleach market independently,
but decided that the acquisition route would be a quicker and more eco-
nomic means of achieving a dominant position; (2) Procter had recently, by
developing a new abrasive cleaner, successfully entered an industry similar
to liquid bleach; (3) Procter was engaged in a vigorous program of diversify-
ing into other product lines closely related to its existing lines, and liquid
bleach was a natural next step; (4) Procter had the marketing experience
and advertising strength that would help assure its success in the bleach
field; and (5) the bleach industry was comparatively easy to enter.43
Wilson was a much more difficult situation. Although the objective
factors favoring entry by Wilson were present (including Nissen's relatively
high profit margin), there was no evidence that it intended to enter through
internal expansion and, indeed, the Wilson management vigorously denied
having any such intention. The court concluded that Wilson's potential en-
try into the gymnastic equipment field was possible, but not strongly so.
Had there been no other significant argument against allowing the merger,
the potential-entrant argument probably would not have been sufficient.
However, the court concluded that Nissen was a strong possible entrant into
some of Wilson's fields, and there were other arguments, as we have seen,
which led the court to enjoin the proposed merger.
Thus, a subjective intent by a large firm to enter a market by internal
growth (or acquisition and expansion of a small firm already in the market)
is, in most cases, a strong factor militating against allowing the entry by
acquisition. Where this factor is absent, the Government will have a more
difficult - but not impossible - task demonstrating that the acquiring
firm is indeed a potential entrant. Procter and Wilson point to three factual
showings that might be pertinent (relationship between the two companies'
product lines, diversification pattern of the acquiring firm, and high profit
margins in the acquired firm's market), and these are listed in the Justice
Department's Merger Guidelines.44 It is difficult to foretell the result if only
one of these three showings can be made, or if the evidence is not strongly
43 386 U.S. at 574, 580-81; see also Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp., 5 TRADE Rec. REP.
73,035 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 29, 1969).
44 The Guidelines also undertake to describe, in market share terms, the kind of firm
whose acquisition by a "likely entrant" will ordinarily be challenged:
(i) any firm with approximately 25% or more of the market;
(ii) one of the two largest firms in a market in which the shares of the two
largest firms amount to approximately 50% or more;
(iii) one of the four largest firms in a market in which the shares of the eight
largest firms amount to approximately 75% or more, provided the merging firm's
share of the market amounts to approximately 10% or more; or
(iv) one of the eight largest firms. in a market in which the shares of these
firms amount to approximately 75% or more, provided either (A) the merging
firm's share of the market is not insubstantial and there are no more than one or
two likely entrants into the market, or (B) the merging firm is a rapidly growing
firm.
MERGER GuIDELINES, supra note 17, no. 18, at 6687-88.
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in favor of the Government on any of the three. Therefore, discriminating
judgments are important, perhaps more so than where reciprocal dealing
possibilities would be created or where the firm to be acquired is the dom-
inant element in a concentrated market. But one kind of case described in
the Guidelines seems almost a sure winner for the Government: "a merger
between an existing competitor in a market and a likely entrant, under-
taken for the purpose of preventing the competitive 'disturbance' or 'dis-
ruption' that such entry might create." 45 As in many other areas of antitrust
law, an intent to prevent or hinder competition can make other evidence
almost unnecessary.
D. General Increase in Concentration
The one argument against conglomerate mergers that has thus far had
no judicial takers is the claim that a particular merger is illegal merely
because it contributes in a significant way to the general increase in con-
centration in American industry.
Trends toward concentration are, it must be remembered, important
in section 7 cases. An example is Brown Shoe.46 In holding the acquisition
of the Kinney retail shoe chain by Brown, a shoe manufacturer, to be ille-
gal, the Supreme Court found it quite relevant that there was a trend of
shoe manufacturers acquiring retail outlets. The same was true for the hor-
izontal aspect of the case: the combination of Brown's retail outlets with
Kinney's was held illegal in large part because the retail shoe business was
already becoming increasingly concentrated. Likewise, in United States v.
Von's Grocery Co.,47 a merger of two retail grocery chains in the Los An-
geles market which eliminate direct competition in less than 1 percent
of that market was held illegal in light of the trend toward concentration
there.
But this is not the same as saying that a merger involving two very
large companies which produces no specific anticompetitive effects in any
defined product market may nevertheless be illegal. Yet, this is just the po-
sition of the present Administration. Attorney General Mitchell, in a speech
in Savannah on June 6, 1969, said very explicitly that the Department of
Justice may very well oppose any merger between any two of the top 200
manufacturing firms or firms of comparable size in other industries (and
will probably oppose any merger between one of the top 200 and any lead-
ing producer in any concentrated industry). 4
It is not likely that this theory will be squarely tested for some time to
come, if ever. As shown in the foregoing pages, more conventional antitrust
theories have been successfully applied in all of the conglomerate merger
45Id. no. 18(b), at 6688.
46 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
47 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
48 Address by Attorney General Mitchell, Georgia Bar Ass'n, June 6, 1969, in 5 TRADE
REc. R P. 50,247 (1969).
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cases to date, and this is likely to continue to be true. The general concen-
tration argument has been utilized as a supplementary theory in the North-
west and ITT-Grinnell-Hartford cases (and in Bendix as well), presumably
to see what kind of judicial reaction it will meet and in the hope of pick-
ing up some favorable language for future cases, 49 but thus far the reaction
has been cool and the language unfavorable.
The trouble with this theory, of course, is that section 7, by its terms,
seems to require a finding that competition is likely to be substantially less-
ened "in any line of commerce in any section of the country." Since the
"section of the country" can be the entire nation, it is the other two parts
of this requirement that make the theory difficult to accept. No court has
yet held that the entire economy is a "line of commerce." Indeed, it can
well be argued that such a holding would make those words meaningless.
Congress, it is true, supplied a good deal of language in the key reports and
the debate on the 1950 amendment to section 7 to verify its concern with
rising concentration in the aggregate as well as in particular industries.50
.But Congress is not incapable of enacting a statute proscribing all mergers
that substantially lessen competition in the economy as a whole. That it did
not do so seems fatal to the general concentration theory.
The other substantial defect in the theory is that it is effects on com-
petition that must be examined in assessing a merger under section 7. Ad-
mittedly, Congress sought to arrest anticompetitive trends in their incip-
iency. 5' Also, minute examination of possible anticompetitive effects is less
necessary where a merger significantly increases concentration in an already
concentrated industry.52 But that is because an oligopolistic market is
known to be less competitive than one in which market shares are more
evenly distributed among a large number of sellers.53 It certainly cannot be
said, in our present state of knowledge, that an economy that is more con-
centrated in general is less competitive. As stated by the White House Task
Force on Antitrust Policy, which was chaired by Chicago Law School Dean
Phil C. Neal, in its July 5, 1968 report, "the level of economy-wide concentra-
tion and numbers of firms that would be incompatible with the maintenance
of a competitive market system is not known." 54 The Task Force on Produc-
49 The Government is also taking the position that a number of possible anticom-
petitive effects (including general concentration) can be aggregated to produce a finding
of illegality even if no one of them is sufficient. The court in Wilson reacted somewhat
favorably to this but the courts in Northwest and ITT-Grinnel-Hartford did not.
50 The references are collected in a well-developed paper delivered last fall to an
American Management Association briefing session by Roland W. Donnem, who is
Director of the Antitrust Division's Policy Planning Section.
51 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963).
53 See, e.g., Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act; Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 659-63 (1962).
54 1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST (NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT),
115 CONC. REc. 5642, 5646 (daily ed. May 27, 1969).
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tivity and Competition appointed by President Nixon and chaired by Pro-
fessor George J. Stigler took the same position in its report last June.55
What is important to recognize is that the chief objections to conglom-
erate mergers involving very large companies, and to increases in concentra-
tion generally, are predominantly social rather than economic. 56 Our eco-
nomic system is evaluated primarily by how well it allocates the nation's
resources in satisfying consumer needs and wants in the most efficient man-
ner. The major specific complaint made about increased concentration is
that "local control" of business is thereby decreased: those who were for-
merly owners become salaried managers, altering their relationship with the
local labor force and the community generally; the major decisions are
made hundreds of miles away; local banks, accountants, lawyers and adver-
tising agencies may be replaced. These are unfortunate consequences some-
times; other times they are not. 7 But they are, in the main, consequences
that do not necessarily affect the indicators of a healthy economic system.
It may be that Congress should supplement the antitrust laws and pro-
hibit certain kinds of conglomerate mergers that do not violate traditional
antitrust principles.58 Such an undertaking, however, would require a care-
ful examination of the specific social implications of increased concentra-
tion, a careful evaluation of how those implications square with the nation's
goals (which themselves could stand a major re-examination), and a careful
drafting of legislation to achieve the objectives that were determined to be
desirable with minimum impairment of other goals and policies. If that
sounds like a tall order, so be it.
III. CLOSING OBSERVATIONS
The main purpose of this paper has not been to delve into the funda-
mentals of the conglomerate phenomenon, but instead to examine the anti-
trust laws and how they are being applied in this area. An assessment of the
developing antitrust guidelines is useful to the businessman and his legal
counsel only if it can help them predict with a reasonable degree of accu-
55 1969 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION (STIGLER
TASK FORCE REPORT), 115 CONG. REC. 6472 (daily ed. June 16, 1969).
56 Some "competition" arguments have been suggested. One is that a conglomerate
may adopt policies to promote its general overall interests and these might be less pro-
competitive than the policies particular subsidiaries might adopt if they had only their
own interests to consider. Another is that the trends toward more and larger conglomerates
will increase the situations in which large firms, previously only competitors, find them-
selves also suppliers and customers of one another, with a consequent reduction of the
pre-existing competitive rivalry. (This is what has been referred to above as mutual
reciprocity.) Obviously, these arguments are difficult to evaluate in the abstract and
probably remain so even in the context of specific cases.
57 For example, a locally owned business in the South might have far more difficulty
eliminating racial discrimination in employment practices than if the business were owned
by a national company.
58 There have been specific proposals for supplementary legislation designed to reach
mergers that contravene the antitrust policies that underlie section 7, but that are not
as easily reached under existing law as they might be. See, e.g., the proposals of the Neal
group. NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 54.
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racy whether an acquisition being considered will be challenged in the
courts or at the Federal Trade Commission. In some respects this is more
important than attempting to predict how the acquisition will be viewed
by an appellate court or even by a district court or hearing examiner after
a full trial. There are several reasons for this:
First, the contemplated acquisition is more likely to receive prompt
and thorough scrutiny than most other kinds of proposed business moves
that might raise antitrust questions. Since April 1969 the FTC has required
that it be notified of all agreements to merge or acquire assets involving
companies with assets of $10 million or more, where the resulting corpora-
tion would have assets of $250 million or more. The notice is due within 10
days after the agreement is reached and no less than 60 days before consum-
mation of the agreement. In addition, any merging party with assets of $250
million must automatically file a Special Report, while any smaller firm
must do so if directed to by the Commission. The same notice and Special
Report must be filed by any company with assets of $250 million or more
within 10 days after it obtains 10 percent or more of the voting stock of a
corporation having assets of $10 million or more. A notice and Special Re-
port must also be filed by a $250 million corporation at least 60 days before
it consummates a stock acquisition that would give it 50 percent of the vot-
ing stock of a $10 million corporation. In both cases the corporation whose
stock is being acquired must also file a Special Report if the Commission so
directs. Finally, even if neither party to a stock acquisition has assets of
$250 million, these same notices, plus Special Reports if specifically directed,
must be filed where the combined assets of the two corporations total $250
million or more. 59
Second, the present head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division
is firmly of the view that section 7 applies to "pure" conglomerate mergers,
and that the Merger Guidelines (which were issued under the previous Ad-
ministration) should not be regarded as the limit of the Department's en-
forcement intentions.
Third, the result of a successful challenge to a merger is normally an
order requiring divestiture of the acquired firm or a substantial part of it.
Where it is likely that divestiture would be difficult to accomplish after a
trial on the merits (and that is often the case), the complaint will be accom-
panied by a motion to enjoin the merger pendente lite. The granting of
such a motion can kill the merger as effectively as a finding of illegality
after a full trial.60
59 See 34 FED. REG. 7592 (May 10, 1969); 34 FED. REG. 7737 (May 15, 1969). For the
form of the Special Report, see I TRADE REG. REP. 4455.10.
60 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill.
1968). For this reason, extensive hearings might be held on the motion for a preliminary
injunction. In United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969),
a temporary restraining order was issued the day after the complaint was filed, and
hearings began that day. The hearings took 18 court days, and in addition there were 2 days
of depositions. A similar situation exists in the bank merger area. Under a 1966 amendment
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, a merger involving a federally insured bank must
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Fourth, even where the court declines to enjoin the merger before trial,
the court might be sufficiently concerned about the possibility that the Gov-
ernment will prevail to enter a "hold separate" order -7 allowing the
merger to be consummated but limiting the ways in which assets may be
combined, preventing disposal of major assets, restricting the issuance of
new securities, and otherwise smoothing the way for a possible divestiture
after trial.61 This kind of order, and the uncertainty over a possible dives.
titure order after trial, can pose enormous financing or stockholder difficul-
ties which can also kill the merger without a trial ever being held.62
For these reasons, care must be taken to evaluate the possibility of anti-
trust challenge to a proposed acquisition involving substantial corporate
parties. Where the merger is likely to be killed by the mere filing of a com-
plaint by the Department of Justice, it may be prudent to solicit the De-
partment's views at an early stage. If it is only the entry of a preliminary
injunction that will terminate the merger, counsel should begin preparing
his case as soon as he concludes that a complaint may be filed. Even if it is
concluded that the merger will not be stopped prior to full trial on the
merits, steps should be taken, if possible, to guard against the lapsing of
financing arrangements and stockholder approval that might result if a
"hold separate" order were to be entered.
One final note: not all mergers, whether conglomerate or not, are vol-
untary arrangements. The "take-over" has become an increasingly important
phenomenon. The Allis-Chalmers and Filtro163 cases show that on the right
facts the involuntary partner can effectively utilize the antitrust laws to
prevent the threatened take-over. Thus, where this kind of acquisition is
contemplated, there is yet another facet to the antitrust planning that must
be considered.
have prior approval of the appropriate banking authority and the Department of Justice
is automatically entitled to a preliminary injunction if it files suit within 30 days after
the approval is secured. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c), as amended, Pub. L. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7. Most
proposed bank mergers are abandoned when this occurs.
61 Orders of this kind were entered in the Northwest and ITT-Grinnell-Hartford
cases. In the case challenging LTV's attempted acquisition of the stock of Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation in April 1969, the parties agreed to comparable restrictions pending
trial. On March 6, 1970, agreement was reached on a consent decree under which the
acquisition would be permitted if LTV would dispose of Braniff Airways, Inc. and the
Okonite Company, and LTV and J & L would be barred from engaging in reciprocity.
Also, LTV, which has meanwhile disposed of National Car Rental Systems, Inc. and
Wilson Sporting Goods Company, would be prohibited from making any major
acquisitions for 10 years without prior approval.
62 Compare the proposed acquisition of American Broadcasting Company by ITT.
The merger agreement was approved by both companies' stockholders in April 1966. Be-
cause transfers of broadcast licenses were involved, prior permission of the Federal Com-
munications Commission had to be obtained. A major battle occurred, with the Depart-
ment of Justice intervening as a party before the FCC and opposing the transfers on
antitrust grounds. The Commission approved the transfers twice, first in December 1966
and then in June 1967, American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 9 F.C.C.2d 546 (1967), but the
Department of Justice appealed. United States v. FCC, Cir. No. 21,147 (D.C. Cir. July 21,
1967). This process took so long that the proposed merger was abandoned in January 1968.
63 See note 16 supra.
